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The outright collapse in pricing in a 
number of markets demonstrates 
how damaging it can be to allow 
almost unfettered access to long-term 
mortgage financing in large amounts 
when those borrowing the money 
have little or no understanding of the 
products in question.
 In many cases, they are not only 
agreeing to buy products that are 
unsuitable for their circumstances, 
they are actively clamouring to buy 
products that are unsuitable for 
their circumstances. If it is illegal to 
drive unsupervised without a valid 
driving licence, which demonstrates 
a minimum level of competence, 
perhaps it should be illegal to 
borrow unsupervised without the 
financial equivalent. 
 Libertarians and free marketeers 
will almost certainly object to this 
proposition. Yes, it goes against the 
ethos of free will that underpins most 
Western thinking. But it could help 
prevent property car crashes, which 
on occasions since 2008 have more 
closely resembled motorway pile-ups.
Would we issue a gun licence to a 
blind person? Certainly not. So why 
are people who find it impossible to 
envisage their financial future be 
allowed to burden themselves with 
debts that are simply unaffordable?
 These thoughts, and others, arise 
from discussion of my thesis on the 
subject of the acquisition, financing and 
insurance of housing entitled To Own, 
To Finance, and To Insure Residential 
Real Estate Revealed. I suggest that 
they merit further and wider debate 
in the long-term best interests of a 
financial services industry that has 
been plagued by disaster after disaster 
over the past five years.
Educating borrowers
I wonder if it would be possible to launch 
an organisation that could enhance 
the financial IQ of millions of people 
internationally. Its prime objective 
would be the prevention of financial 
ills rather than their cure; increasing 
people’s ability to understand 
personal finance matters could help 
transform lives.
 Consider, for instance, the case 
of a young couple eager to acquire 
their first home, flying in the face of 
financial reality in their determination to 
Might the time be right to introduce the financial equivalent of a 
driving licence? I think the answer could well be a resounding 
yes. A study of events in housing markets across the developed 
world over the past years has pushed me towards this view. 
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secure a mortgage. Both are working. 
They have no children. They have a 
comfortable level of disposable income 
month to month. They have savings. 
In short, they tick every box on the 
creditworthiness spectrum. A bank 
would be foolish not to lend.
 But this is today. What about 
tomorrow? Next month? Next year? 
When they have a baby? And they 
lose an entire income? And have 
another baby? And realise they need a 
larger house?
 Their prof ile has changed, 
underlining the case for the argument 
in favour of making a long-term 
credit decision based not on current 
affordability, but on future, sustainable 
profitability. A bank that refused them 
credit on that basis might later find itself 
with a higher quality loan book that it 
would otherwise have had.
 If it is illegal to borrow, then it will be 
illegal to lend. This neatly circumvents 
the reality uncovered in the writing of 
my original thesis. Who is to blame 
for the mortgage finance mess – is 
it profit-driven lenders mis-selling? 
Is it commission-based brokers and 
other intermediaries mis-advising? Is it 
borrowers mis-buying? The allocation 
of blame, or, perhaps a better word, 
responsibility, is far from easy.
A licence to lend
How might this concept be translated 
into reality? Let’s return to the original 
driving licence analogy. Obtaining a 
driving licence involves the acquisition 
of driving knowledge through formal 
lessons from a wide range of private 
sector teachers, and practice on 
the road, and the passing of tests in 
motoring practice and theory at official 
government-sponsored centres.
 Existing financial advisers would 
be obvious candidates to create a 
national network of instructors. In 
those countries where they are already 
required to carry out a thorough 
review of a would-be borrower’s 
financial situation before making a 
recommendation (which they must 
be able to justify should the regulators 
come calling), this would represent only 
a slight reshaping of their current role. 
 The focus would shift away from 
hand-holding and advising their 
clients and move towards teaching 
them. The new emphasis would be on 
equipping them with the tools needed 
to understand personal finance, and 
to pass a formal examination at a 
government-approved test centre.
 The UK already has an established 
network of Citizens Advice Bureaux 
(CAB), which, especially in difficult 
f inancial times such as those 
experienced recently, sees a surge 
in demand for independent financial 
advice. It would be interesting to 
examine how simple it might be to 
adjust their operating model in order 
that they might help on a preventative 
basis rather than a curative basis. 
 This in turn would provide a 
template for other countries that 
lack such a service. The resulting 
structure would surely represent 
an improvement on the prevailing 
system, in which are embedded clear 
conflicts of interest on the sell-side, 
and often widespread ignorance on 
the buy-side.
“If it is illegal to drive unsupervised without 
a valid driving licence, which demonstrates 
a minimum level of competence, perhaps 
it should be illegal to borrow unsupervised 
without the financial equivalent.”
 In the Netherlands, we have the 
Institute for Budget Education (NIBUD), 
which educates and advises (primarily 
through public media) households on 
financial issues in general (mortgages, 
insurance policies, personal loans, 
etc.). However, this advice is tailored 
towards general issues rather than 
individual problems. Maybe this could 
provide a bridge towards the UK’s 
case-based CAB, which is generally 
highly thought of by its troubled clients.
  My original research uncovered 
remarkably little hard evidence of 
mis-selling. My dissertation contains 
four studies that cover aspects of 
homeownership in the Netherlands. It 
examines the effects of homeownership 
and the decision making process by 
households regarding mortgage type. 
Furthermore, the functioning of the 
mortgage origination process including 
the effect of brokers is studied. The 
last paper examines which factors 
characterize household demand for 
mortgage insurance.
Aligned interests
The central question in the third 
study (chapter four) is concerned 
with the question of whether there is 
evidence for a misalignment of interest 
between financial intermediaries and 
their clientele. Studies on the role of 
mortgage brokers in the US show that 
the objectives of mortgage brokers 
and their clientele are not necessarily 
aligned. This occurs when they are 
not responsible for, or compensated 
conditional on, loan performance. 
Moreover, commission-based pay can 
induce brokers to recommend and sell 
those products that are most profitable 
to themselves. 
 There is, however, a counteracting 
force because credit risk exposure 
creates an incentive for the originator to 
monitor the underwriting behaviour of 
intermediaries and screen applications. 
In the presence of reputation and credit 
risks, it is unlikely that they will employ 
different underwriting standards for 
credit that is originated through an 
intermediary compared to what they 
would originate directly (so-called 
direct-written). 
 Proposals to alter the compensation 
structure of intermediaries, for 
example, to hourly billing rather than 
based on commission from sales, 
are probably ineffective in reducing 
conflicting interests and come with 
their own incentive problems. In 
addition, the effectiveness of broker 
regulation to avoid a misalignment of 
broker and client interests has received 
mixed empirical evidence. The results 
indicate that the regulation of lenders 
is perhaps more important than either 
of these two approaches. 
 I will add that even after careful 
consideration of the issue, I remain 
uncertain as to whether I would 
advocate training for intrinsically 
unmotivated people versus mandatory 
advice for those people who do not 
have (but perhaps also do not want 
to have) the “financial driving licence”. 
The former could be very ineffective. 
 One direction for future research 
might be to compare the UK’s tailor-
made CAB approach to the Dutch 
general approach NIBUD system 
to attempt to identify whether one 
is more effective than the other in 
altering consumer behaviour. In the 
meantime, perhaps households need 
to be reminded of that ancient warning 
- caveat emptor – rather than develop 
an ever-deepening dependence upon 
the protection of regulators and other 
official figures.
This article is based on Ruben’s 
PhD thesis To Own, To Finance, and 
To Insure Residential Real Estate 
Revealed. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
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This disse
rtation co
ntains fou
r studies 
that cont
ribute to 
our under
standing 
of the
social and
 financial 
consequen
ces of hom
eownersh
ip. The fir
st study e
xamines t
he effects
of homeo
wnership 
on reside
ntial satis
faction an
d neighbo
rhood saf
ety. I sho
w that
neighborh
oods with
 higher h
omeowne
rship rate
s are safe
r and tha
t resident
s are mor
e
satisfied w
ith their n
eighborho
od. In the
 second st
udy, I pro
vide insig
ht into th
e decision
making pr
ocess that
 househol
ds underg
o when ar
ranging m
ortgage fi
nancing. S
pecifically
,
I documen
t that tho
se househ
olds who
 are eithe
r less risk
 averse o
r more fi
nancially
literate ar
e more li
kely to o
pt for alt
ernative m
ortgage p
roducts su
ch as inte
rest-only
mortgage
s. The thi
rd chapte
r focuses 
on the m
ortgage o
rigination
 process 
and inves
 -
tigates w
hether pr
ovision-ba
sed comp
ensation o
f financia
l intermed
iaries affe
cts under -
writing ou
tcomes fo
r househo
lds. The re
sults indic
ate that th
is, contrar
y to popu
lar belief,
is not the
 case whe
n mortga
ge lender
s are exp
osed to d
efault and
 reputatio
nal risks,
thereby p
roviding t
hem with
 an incen
tive to sc
reen mort
gage app
lications a
nd monito
r
brokers. T
he final st
udy invest
igates the
 demand f
or mortga
ge insuran
ce. Househ
olds with
recourse 
mortgage
 debt fac
e wealth 
risks in c
ase they 
are forced
 to sell t
heir hous
e
following
 an advers
e income 
shock. The
 findings i
n this stud
y support
 the hypo
thesis tha
t
household
s eligible 
for insura
nce who 
are overc
onfident 
are signif
icantly les
s likely to
obtain mo
rtgage ins
urance.
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